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Presentations and This and That: Logic in Action1Michael Miller and Donald PerlisDepartment of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742mm@cs.umd.edu, perlis@cs.umd.eduAbstractThe tie between linguistic entities (e.g., words)and their meanings (e.g., objects in the world) isone that a reasoning agent had better know aboutand be able to alter when occasion demands. Thishas a number of important commonsense uses.The formal point, though, is that a new treatmentis called for so that rational behavior via a logiccan measure up to the constraint that it be ableto change usage, employ new words, change mean-ings of old words, and so on. Here we do not oera new logic per se; rather we borrow an existingone (step logic) and apply it to the specic issueof language change.Introduction\Did you hear that John broke his leg?"\No, really? That's a shame!"\Yes, and his wife now has to doeverything for him."\Wife? John isn't married. WhichJohn are you talking about?"\I'm talking about John Jones."\Oh, I thought you meant John Smith."The above apparently mundane conversationhides some very tricky features facing any for-mal representational and inferential mechanism,whether for use in natural language processing,planning, or problem-solving. For here occurs animplicit case of language control. As it dawns onthe two speakers above that they are using thename \John" dierently they need to reason aboutusage and adopt a strategy to sort out the confu-sion, e.g., by using last names too.The ability of a reasoning agent to exercise con-trol of its own reasoning process, and in particu-lar over its language, has been hinted at a numberof times in the literature. Rieger seems to havebeen the rst to enunciate this, in his notion ofreferenceability [Rieger, 1974], followed by others[Perlis, 1985], [McCarthy and Lifschitz, 1987], etc.1This research was partially supported by NSFgrant IRI-9109755.
The underlying idea, as we conceive it here, is thatthe tie between linguistic entities (e.g., words) andtheir meanings (e.g., objects in the world) is a tiethat the agent had better know about and be ableto alter when occasion demands. This has a num-ber of important commonsense uses, which havebeen listed elsewhere [Perlis, 1991].The formal point, though, is that a new treat-ment is called for so that rational behavior via alogic can measure up to the constraint that it beable to change usage, employ new words, changemeanings of old words, and so on. The usual xedlanguage with a xed semantics that is the stock-in-trade of AI seems inappropriate to this task.Here we do not oer a new logic per se; ratherwe borrow an existing one (step-logic [Elgot-Drapkinand Perlis, 1990], [Elgot-Drapkin, 1991]) and ap-ply it to the specic issue of language change. Ref-erenceability, to stick with Rieger's terminology,demands that the agent { and therefore the agent'slanguage { have expressions available to denoteexpressions themselves (e.g., via quotation) andalso to denote the tie between an expression andwhat it stands for. The form that this word-objecttie takes seems to vary according to context,2 andthat is what this paper will focus on, by examiningseveral specic commonsense settings.Traditional descriptions of nonmonotonic rea-soning envision nonmonotonicity as a relationshipbetween theories: from one theory certain the-orems follow that do not follow when that the-ory is augmented with additional information (ax-ioms). However, this relationship is expressed onlyin the meta-theory; the usual logics pay attentionto behavior only within a given theory. On theother hand, \theory change" is the central fea-ture of the step-logic formalism. In brief, a step-logic models belief reasoning by sanctioning in-ference one-step-at-a-time, where the time of rea-soning is integral to the logic. Complicated rea-soning made of many successive inferences in se-quence take as many steps as the sequence con-tains. Error, change of mind, change of language,and change of language usage all are time-tempered2Recently, McCarthy and others have been investigat-ing formal theories of context ([McCarthy, 1993], [Guha,1991]). The implications this may have for our work are,at this point, unclear.
in that they are appropriately characterized onlywith regard to a historical account of beliefs, lan-guage, and its usage. The one-step-at-a-time ap-proach oers a natural account of such histories.A key informal idea for us will be that of apresentation, which means roughly a situation orcontext in which attention has been called to a pre-sumed entity, but not necessarily an entity we havea very clear determination of at rst.3 This, we ar-gue, is the case in virtually all situations initially,until we get our bearings. But before we actuallymake an identication we determine (perhaps un-consciously) that there is something for us to dealwith. This is a small point as far as initial mat-ters go, but becomes important if later we decideto change our usages. Some examples will help.We have devised a formalism that \solves" theseexample problems and have implemented our so-lution to some of the problems. Space allows onlya brief sketch of certain underlying mechanisms.4Rosalie's CarA car ashes by us, and we quickly identify it asRosalie's car (which for simplicity we denote rc).We may be unaware of any recognition process,thinking simply that we see rc ash by. Then wenotice that the license plate on the car is not whatwe would expect to see on rc, and we re-assessour belief that we are seeing rc. Something, wetell ourselves, made us think this (the car we seedriving away) is that (the car rc we already knewof from earlier times). Once we have producedappropriate internal tokens, we can then say thatwe mistook this for that. The something-or-otherthat brought about our mistake is what we call apresentation. It will not play a formal role for us,but simply a motivational one in leading us to ourformal devices.How can we formalize the notion of taking thisfor that? We begin by looking into the relation-ship between the two { not a physical relationship,as in features that the two cars may share (thoughthis may ultimately have a bearing on belief revi-sion) but rather a cognitive relationship betweenthe entities. This relationship is suggested in thecase of the mistaken car by the English statement,\I mistook this car to be that (Rosalie's)." Thethis here can be viewed as a demonstrative which3The vagueness in our notion of presentation does not,at this stage, hinder our formal treatment. However, webelieve it will eventually be necessary to clarify this notion.This is the focus of ongoing work. Among other things,it will involve a notion of attention, as hinted at by ourinformal \this" and \that" description below.4See [Miller, 1993] and [Miller and Perlis, 1993] for morecomplete details.
(together with an appropriate demonstration) isused to pick out the mistaken car, the one whichpassed by. The that can be viewed as anotherdemonstrative which is used to pick out rc. Thestatement, \I mistook this car to be Rosalie's",indicates a cognitive tie between two objects, au-tomobiles in this case, that are in a sense linkedin a (former) belief by the term rc.Essentially what has happened is this: Ini-tially, we are aware of an interest in one car only:Rosalie's; then later, in two: Rosalie's and the carthat ashed by (i.e., the car mistakenly identiedto be Rosalie's). In a sense, the term `rc' in theoriginal belief `rc just went by' refers to both ofthese cars.5 That is, we had rc in mind but con-nected a \mental image" of it to the wrong car,the one that ashed by. As such, beliefs aboutthe incident reect an unfortunate mental cona-tion or compression of these two cars that must betorn apart in the reasoning process.6We use the 4-ary predicate symbol FITB tostate that an object of perception (presented atsome time or step) is at rst identied to be some(other) object, thereby producing a (set of) be-lief(s), i.e., FITB(x; y; S; i) says that object ofperception, x, which was presented at step i, isat rst identied to be y producing the beliefsin the set S. Then we use Russell's -operatora la Russell to pick out the this that was mistakenfor that , e.g., xFITB(x; rc; fF lashedBy(rc)g; t){ \the unique object of presentation, presented atstep t, which was at rst identied to be rc whichproduced the belief F lashedBy(rc)." This realityterm is used to denote what a reasoner currentlytakes to be some entity, possibly lling in for apreviously held, but incorrect description of thesame entity. (As a shorthand convention we usetfitb(y; S; i), \the thing (object of presentation)which was at rst identied to be : : :", in placeof (x)FITB(x; y; S; i).) By incorporating realityterms we are able to express certain errors of ob-ject misidentication reected in one's former be-liefs, for instance: tfitb(rc; fF lashedBy(rc)g; t) 6=rc { \the unique object of presentation which wasat rst identied to be rc at step t, which producedthe belief F lashedBy(rc), is not rc. (We abbrevi-ate assertions of the form tfitb(t; S; i) 6= t, (whichwe call tutorials) by MISID(t; S; i).) Assertingthe error sets in motion a belief revision processwhich is characterized, in part, by the following:The earlier belief F lashedBy(rc) is disinherited,75We assume that beliefs are symbolically representedinside the head in some mental language. [Fodor, 1979]6The term compression is borrowed from [Maida, 1991].7Disinheritance is a fundamental feature of step-logic.In particular, when two simultaneously held beliefs arein direct contradiction, neither is inherited to the nextstep, although either may later be re-proven by other
i.e., the step-logic ceases to have that belief, al-though it does retain (as a belief) the historicalfact that it once had that belief, andF lashedBy(tfitb(rc; fF lashedBy(rc)g; t))is produced.Just how does one come to suspect and detecterroneous beliefs? We have already alluded to oneanswer, namely that we come to suspect an er-ror upon noting competing or incoherent beliefs.We may suspend the use of potentially problem-atic beliefs, perhaps speculating and hypothesiz-ing about alternative views of the world, in an ef-fort to hash out the diculty. How does one decidejust which alternative to have faith in? In somecases one may use a hypothesize-and-test processto ferret out the problem from the set of possibleerrors that might have been made. A completeprincipled account of how one speculates and thenconrms or denies her suspicions is beyond thescope of this paper.8 Instead, a simplifying as-sumption is to postulate a tutor or an advisor thatcan tell us about our errors.9 The tutor plays therole of a friend who says, \Hey, that's not Rosalie'scar". How the agent comes to represent and usethe friend's advice is the issue we are addressing.One and Two JohnsOur One John example is very similar to that ofrc above, but will help us in moving toward thethird example below. Here we imagine that weare talking to Sally about a third person, whomwe initially come to identify as our friend John,merely in virtue of matching John to Sally's de-scription of the person, or the context of the con-versation, etc., but not in virtue of hearing Sallyuse the name \John". Later we nd out it is notJohn, but someone else.There is no appropriate entity before us in per-ception which has been misidentied as in the caseof the mistaken car; rather it is an abstract entity,a someone-or-other, still an object of presentation,the person that Sally had in mind. There is thissomeone that has been taken to be that , John.Our formalism treats abstract (objects of) presen-tation(s) of this sort much like the case of rc.means. Another way disinheritance allows the agent tocease believing a w, that we introduce here, is based on amisidentication.8It is likely that default reasoning is involved as is knowl-edge about the likelihood of errors (e.g., a car is likely to bemisidentied since there are typically many similar lookingcars).9See [McCarthy, 1958] for a discussion about programsand advice taking.
Now let us extend this to the Two Johns case:We are in a situation in which we are presentedwith a notion of a person, whom we (come to)think is our friend John. Then we are led to be-lieve that he has a broken leg and his wife has todo everything for him. Later we suspect that thereis a confusion, that not everything we are hearingmakes sense. (John, our friend, is not married.)Is Sally wrong? Or have we got the wrong personin mind? Now here is the twist: Sally starts em-ploying the name \John" to refer to this person.10Perhaps she is talking about a dierent John. Toeven consider this option we need to be able to \re-lax" our usage so that \John" is not rmly tied tojust one referent. And later when Sally says thatshe is talking about John Jones, not our friend,John Smith, we need a way to refer to the twoentities without using the term John. We maycontinue to mention the name, but judiciously, asit is ambiguous.We can try to employ the same formal strat-egy that the agent used above. Namely, we mayinitially come to suspect thattfitb(john;BrokenLeg(john)) 6= johnwhich has the English reading: \the unique ob-ject of presentation which was at rst identied tobe John, producing the belief BrokenLeg(john),is not John." But then once we hear Sally usethe name \John" to refer to the person with thebroken leg, whom we now believe is not our friendJohn, more must be done { the name \John" mustbe disambiguated.This is where we must exhibit control over ourlanguage and language usage. First the ambiguitymust be recognized. That is, we must come tosee that this and that share the same name. Oncethat is done, new terms should be created, each tounambiguously denote one of the two Johns.Proper naming and the use of names is madeexplicit with the predicate symbol Names. Wewrite Names(x; y; i) to state that x names objecty which rst came to be known (by the reasoner)at time or step i; this could be weakened to time i, or time  i, etc., if the exact time is not known.Including the third argument is somewhat non-standard, though not without a commonsense ba-sis. We usually have at least a vague idea of whenwe come to know about someone. We can thinkof Names(x; y; i) as collapsing IsNamed(x; y) ^FirstLearnedAbout(I; y; i), where I is intended tobe the rst person pronoun.10The sequence of events here is dierent than that re-ected in the dialogue at the beginning of this abstract.Specically, Sally uses the name \John" here only after wecome to think that she is talking about our friend John.In the full paper we also discuss another version, in whichSally uses the name \John" at the outset.
To make ambiguity precise the binary predi-cate symbol Amb is used to state that a namedoes not refer uniquely beyond a certain step. Ax-iom AM expresses this:AM : (8x)(9yzij)f(Names(x; y; i) ^Names(x; z; j) ^ y 6= z ^ i  j)!Amb(x; j)gIt says that if two dierent objects share a name,then the name is ambiguous for the reasoner oncehe became aware of both objects.Once an ambiguity arises, our reasoner willneed to disambiguate any belief using the ambigu-ous term. We use RTA(x; y; i) to state that objectx is referred to as y prior to step i. In particu-lar if Names(x; y; j) then RTA(x; y; k) for k > j,trta(y; i) is used an abbreviation for:xRTA(x; y; i)\the unique thing referred to as y prior to step i",itself a non-ambiguous reality term.Figure 1 gives a brief sketch of the evolution ofreasoning we have in mind. In the gure we useM ,BL, j, and `j to abbreviateMarried, BrokenLeg,john, and `john respectively. Also j1 is used toabbreviate the expression trta(`j; 2), i.e.,j1 = xRTA(x; `j; 2)namely \the unique thing referred to as `john' priorto step 2", and j2 is used to abbreviate the expres-sion tfitb(trta(`j; 2); fM (j); B(j)g; 2), i.e.,j2 = xFITB(x; yRTA(y; `j; 2); fM (j); B(j)g; 2)namely \the unique thing which was rst identiedto be the unique thing referred to as `john' prior tostep 2, which produced the beliefs Married(john)and BrokenLeg(john) at step 2." The predicatesymbol Contra indicates a contradiction betweenits arguments, a signal to the reasoner that some-thing is amiss thereby initiating a belief revisionprocess.11We can view each step as a discrete moment inthe reasoning process. Formulae associated witheach step are intended to be (some of) those rel-evant to the story as time passes. At each step,underlined ws reect beliefs newly acquired atthat step. Others, in step-logic terminology, areinherited from the previous step. Ellipses indicatethat all beliefs shown in the previous step are in-herited to the current step.Beliefs at step 1 are those held before the agent'sconversation with Sally and those at step 9 reect11E.g., suspending the use of potentially problematicbeliefs, in particular the contradictands and their conse-quences. See [Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis, 1990] for details.
Step 1: :M(j);Names(`j; j; 1); AMStep 2: : : : ; BL(j);M(j)(Sally: \...his leg is broken and his wife...")Step 3: AM;Names(`j; j; 1); Contra(:M(j);M(j))(Agent: \Impossible! He isn't married.")Step 4: : : : ;MISID(j; fM(j); B(j)g; 2)(Sally: \You misidentied who I'm talking about.")Step 5: AM;M(tfitb(j; fM(j); BL(j)g; 2));BL(tfitb(j; fM(j); BL(j)g; 2))(Agent: \So that's what's wrong.")Step 6: : : ::M(j)(<Reinstate Marital Belief>)Step 7: : : : ;Names(`j; tfitb(j; fM(j); BL(j)g; 2); 2)(Sally: \I'm talking about John.")Step 8: : : : ; Amb(`j; 2)(Agent: \Oh, they have the same name!")Step 9: AM;:M(j1);M(j2); BL(j2);Names(`j; j1);Names(`j; j2);j2 6= j1;(Agent: \Now I've got it.")Figure 1: Sketch of stepped-reasoning in the TwoJohns story.an unambiguous account of the two Johns, onenow denoted by j1 and the other by j2, once theproblem is sorted out. In between are steps whosebeliefs reect information acquired via the conver-sation with Sally (steps 2 and 7) and via her advice(step 4); steps whose beliefs reect that problemshave been noted (a contradiction is noted in step3 and the ambiguity is noted in step 8); and stepsreecting disinheritance (going from step 2 to 3,and from step 5 to 6).The indicated steps have the following intuitivegloss: (1) the agent believes that John is not mar-ried, and is named \John". Then (2) comes to be-lieve his leg is broken and he is married. This pro-duces a contradiction, noted in (3), so neither mar-ital belief is retained. Advice is then taken thatJohn has been misidentied (4) which leads to the
retraction (disinheritance) of the belief that Johnhas a broken leg (6). The agent learns that the`other person' is named \John" (7), notes the am-biguity (8), and takes corrective action (9) by cre-ating and incorporating the unambiguous termsj1 and j2, one for each John.Formal TreatmentThere are several notable features of the steppedapproach to reasoning illustrated in the previoussection which will need to be preserved in a for-mal device applied to the specic issue of reasoningabout former beliefs. Most conspicuous is that thereasoning be situated in a temporal context. Astime progresses, a reasoner's set of currently ac-cepted beliefs evolves. Beliefs become former be-liefs by being situated in an ever changing \now",of which the reasoner is aware.Secondly, inconsistency may arise and when itdoes its eect should not be disastrous; rather itshould be controllable and remedial, setting in mo-tion a fairly broad belief revision process, whichincludes belief retraction.Finally, the logic itself must be specially tai-lored to be exible or \active" enough to allow,even encourage, language change and usage changewhen necessary. As a theoretical tool the generalstep-logic framework developed in [Elgot-Drapkinand Perlis, 1990] and [Elgot-Drapkin, 1991] is wellsuited to these desiderata.A step-logic models reasoning by describingand producing inferences (beliefs) one step at atime, where the time of reasoning is integral to thelogic. Complicated reasoning made of many suc-cessive inferences in sequence take as many stepsas that sequence contains. A particular step-logicis a member of a class of step-logic formalisms;each particular step-logic is characterized by itsown inference and observation functions (illus-trated below).One distinguishing feature of step-logics is thatonly a nite number of beliefs (i.e., theorems) areheld at any given discrete time, or step, of thereasoning process. Thus we can view each step asa discrete moment in a reasoning process.Let , , and  (with or without subscripts) bews of a rst-order language L and let i 2N. Thefollowing illustrates what a step in the modeledreasoning process of a step-logic looks like.i: , , , : : :represents the belief set of the agent being modeledat step i , i.e., if it is now step (or time) i then ,, and  are currently believed.A w becomes an i-theorem (roughly, a beliefa step i) in virtue of being proven (inferred) at
step i. Proofs are based on a step-logic's inferencefunction, which extends the historical sequence ofbeliefs one step at a time. An inference functioncan be viewed as a collection of inference ruleswhich re in parallel at each step in the reason-ing process to produce the next step's theorems.For every i 2 N, the set of i-theorems are justthose ws which can be deduced from the previ-ous step(s), each using only one application of anapplicable rule of inference.Inference rules, in their most general form, ad-here to the structure suggested by rule schema RSbelow.RS: i  j : i j1 ; : : : ; i jm... ...i : i1 ; : : : ; ini+ 1 : 1; : : : ; pwhere i; j 2 N and (i   j)  0. The idea behindschema RS is this: at any step of the reasoningprocess the inference of 1 through p as (i + 1)-theorems is mandated when all of i j1 throughi jm are (i   j)-theorems, and all of i j+11through i j+1r are (i  j+1)-theorems, : : : , andall of i1 through in are i-theorems.Now we apply this to Two Johns. We will dis-cuss several of the important step-logic inferencerules which come into play in steps 1 through 9of gure 1. (Others are treated fully in [Miller,1993]).12\Observations" can be thought of as non-logical axioms or facts which the agent acquiresover time. Observations are proven in accordancewith rule O:Rule O: i:i+ 1 :  if  2 Obs(i + 1)where the function Obs is tailored to correspondto the particular problem to be solved. For TwoJohns Obs is dened byObs(i) =8>><>>: :M(j);Names(`j; j; 1); AM if i = 1M(j); B(j) if i = 2MISID(j;fM(j); B(j)g; 2) if i = 4Names(`j; tfitb(j;fM(j); B(j)g; 2); 2) if i = 7; otherwise12Among those not discussed here are rules for inheri-tance (of beliefs from one step to the next), modus ponens,contradiction handling and other belief disinheritance, andnegative introspection.
which indicates beliefs which the agent held priorto \talking with Sally" (those in Obs(1)) and thoseacquired while \talking with Sally" (those inObs(2),Obs(4), and Obs(7)). Thus the use of rule O addsnew beliefs at steps 1, 2, 4 and 7 in in the solutionto Two Johns (as depicted in gure 1).The \MisidenticationRenaming" rule (M)takes care of the renaming of a misidentied objectin the beliefs produced by the presentation. It saysthis: If , containing the term t, was produced bya presentation at step k and a misidentication oft comes to the reasoner's attention at a later step i,then at i+1 the reasoner will believe that  holdsof the misidentied object (of presentation), i.e.,tfitb(t; S; k) where S is a set of ws and  2 S.Rule M: i : MISID(t; S; k)i+ 1 : (t=tfitb(t; S; k)) where  2 SIn gure 1 rule M applies at step 4 to pro-duce the beliefsM (tfitb(j; fM (j); BL(j)g; 2)) andBL(tfitb(j; fM (j); BL(j)g; 2)) which appear at step5. The \Ambiguity Renaming" rule (A) dis-ambiguates name clashes:Rule A: i : Amb(`x;k); (x)i+ 1 : (x=trta(`x; k))This rule takes an antecedent w (x) whichuses the ambiguous term x and eliminates the of-fending term replacing it with trta(`x; k), whichmentions but does not use x. In gure 1 rule Aapplies at step 8 to produce the beliefs :M (j1),M (j2), BL(j2), Names(`j; j1), Names(`j; j2) andj2 6= j1 which appear at step 9. (Recall that bothj1 and j2 abbreviate terms which contain the sub-term trta(`j; 2), which is created by rule A.)Our full system has seven additional inferencerules, including a \Name-use" rule that can ap-propriately lead the reasoner into contradiction ifnames are not disambiguated.Concluding RemarksA formal \active" logic based on step-logic hasbeen illustrated. This has been applied to theproblem of language change, whereby an agent canalter her usage of expressions and create new ex-pressions, as demanded by new observations.References[Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis, 1990] Elgot-Drapkin,J. and Perlis, D. 1990. Reasoning situated in
time I: Basic concepts. Journal of Experimentaland Theoretical Arti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